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Actuality in Theology and Philosophy1 
Simon Oliver 
University of Nottingham 
 
In this essay, I will discuss a tendency in contemporary philosophy to prioritise the 
possible over the actual. This seems to be a very significant shift from pre-modern 
philosophy and theology which maintains the priority of actuality over potentiality. The 
clearest expression of this latter view can be found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: 
 
Now since we have distinguished the several senses of priority, it is obvious that 
actuality is prior to potentiality. By potentiality I mean not that which we have 
defined as “a principle of change which is in something other than the thing 
changed, or in that same thing qua other,” but in general any principle of motion 
and rest; for nature also is in the same genus as potentiality, because it is a 
principle of motion, although not in some other thing, but in the thing itself qua 
itself. To every potentiality of this kind actuality is prior, both in formula and 
substance; in time it is sometimes prior and sometimes not.2 
 
Aristotle further explains the sense in which potentiality might be temporally prior to 
actuality. He points out that a seed, which is potentially corn, is prior in time to the corn 
which it will later become. This is to say that something which is numerically identical 
                                                 
1 This essay is greatly indebted to a number of extremely fruitful conversations with my colleague Dr. 
Johannes Hoff of the University of Wales, Lampeter. Omissions and errors are entirely my own. 
2 Aristotle (trans. Hugh Tredennick), Metaphysics I-IX (Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), IX.8.1049b4-15. 
(this one seed becomes this one ear of corn) features potentiality prior to actuality. 
However, there will always be something formally identical (this ear of corn has the same 
form as the seed which it generates) which is in act and which is prior to that which is 
potential. In other words, a seed, which is potentially an ear of corn, is generated by that 
which is actually an ear of corn. In the sense of ‘form’, actuality is prior to potentiality. 
 
In his commentary on this portion of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Aquinas makes clear that 
actuality precedes  potentiality conceptually and with respect to knowledge. He points out 
that potentiality is always defined in terms of actuality, but actuality is not in turn defined 
by means of something else, but is only made known inductively.3 For Aquinas, it is the 
actuality of the divine which establishes the priority of actuality over potency in both 
being and knowledge. 
 
Before the world existed it was possible for it to be, not indeed because of the 
passive potentiality of matter, but because of the active power of God.4 
 
Even if our knowledge begins in potency and passes to actuality5, it is always preceded 
by the actuality of God’s own knowledge. Our motion from potential knowledge to actual 
                                                 
3 St. Thomas Aquinas (trans. John P. Rowan), Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1995), IX.7.1846. 
4 St. Thomas Aquinas (trans. Thomas Gilby, OP), Summa Theologiae (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 1a.46.1 ad 1. All translations of the Summa Theologiae are taken from that by the English 
Province of the Order of Preachers, general editor Thomas Gilby, OP. 
5 For example, I potentially know how to speak Portuguese and, by the motion of learning, come actually to 
know how to speak Portuguese. 
knowledge is, for Aquinas, a deepening participation in the eternal actuality of God’s 
self-knowledge.6 
 
Modern philosophy tends to reverse this priority. It marks a point of distinction with 
theology which continues to prioritise the actual. How does philosophy prioritise 
potentiality? In a recent article, Michael Rea, in the course of discussing the application 
of analytic philosophical methods within the sphere of Christian theology, describes a 
critique of conceptual analysis which can be understood in terms of the prioritisation of 
potentiality.7 Rea points to the work of Bas van Fraassen. Although van Fraassen’s 
contribution to analytic metaphysics in the form of his ‘constructive empiricism’ has been 
very considerable, he has been forceful in his criticism of certain approaches to 
metaphysical issues. Put very briefly, van Fraassen argues that such metaphysics can 
result in the creation of ‘simulacra’ which become the objects of philosophers’ 
discussions. Rea cites a particular example from van Fraassen’s work.8 Imagine posing 
the question ‘Does the world exist?’ Philosophers proceed to define the term ‘world’ with 
considerable nuance and detail before claiming that the world exists if and only if the 
world as they have defined it exists. What makes the world of the philosophers a 
                                                 
6 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a.84.a5.responsio: ‘Secondly, a thing is spoken of as known in another as 
in a principle of knowledge; for instance, we might say that things seen by sunlight are seen in the sun. In 
this sense we must say that the human soul knows everything in the divine ideas, and that by participating 
in them we know everything. For the intellectual light in us is nothing more than a participating likeness of 
the uncreated light in which the divine ideas are contained.’ Aquinas goes on to explain that, besides the 
intellectual light which is in us, species taken from material things are required for knowledge. He therefore 
avoids the sense that material singulars are insignificant and that our knowledge is purely and exclusively a 
knowledge of eternal ideas. Nevertheless, material singulars have being (esse commune) by participation in 
being itself. They are genuine and potent secondary causes of our knowledge. This is explained in Summa 
Theologiae, 1a.14.a8.ad3. See also Summa Theologiae, 1a.15. 
7 It should be said that Rea does not express the matter in terms of actuality and potentiality. I take it that 
this portion of his very clear and helpful essay is more particularly concerned with the nature of conceptual 
analysis in metaphysics. 
8 Bas van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, cited by Rea, 
‘Introduction’ in Crisp and Rea (eds.), Analytic Theology, p.23. 
simulacrum is not the fact that it is postulated, but that ‘satisfying a philosopher’s 
analysis of the concept ‘world’ is something very different from being a world.’9 
 
This tendency is reflected in much philosophy of religion. The philosopher identifies an 
apparently rigorous and clear, almost self-evident, definition of the term ‘God’ (just read 
the opening six lines of Richard Swinburne’s The Coherence of Theism) and proceeds to 
demonstrate the existence of this simulacrum, or, to put it another way, this idol.10 ‘God’ 
is postulated and defined in order to examine the possibility of this ‘God’s’ existence. 
Kierkegaard famously pointed out this approach with reference to the following example 
which one can relate to debates concerning the existence of God. 
 
It is generally a difficult matter to want to demonstrate that something 
exists…The whole process of demonstration continually becomes something 
entirely different, becomes an expanding concluding development of what I 
conclude from having presupposed that the object of investigation exists. 
Therefore, whether I am moving in the world of sensate palpability or in the 
world of thought, I never reason in conclusion to existence, but I reason in 
conclusion from existence. For example, I do not demonstrate that a stone exists 
                                                 
9 Rea, op.cit., p.23. 
10 Van Fraassen’s criticism in the realm of metaphysics and the philosophy of science is in some ways 
paralleled in the work of  philosophers of religion as diverse as D.Z. Phillips and Jean-Luc Marion. Phillips, 
for example, spurred on by the example of Wittgenstein, points out that philosophers of religion ought not 
to discuss philosophical abstractions (‘simulacra’), but rather take account of what the religious actually do 
and say – of the way religions ‘work’ and the so-called ‘grammar of belief’. See, for example, D. Z. 
Phillips, Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
This is quite familiar and is often expressed in terms of a critique of the discussion of the so-called ‘God of 
the philosophers’ which is, in fact, no one else’s God. 
but that something that exists is a stone. The court of law does not demonstrate 
that a criminal exists but that the accused, who does exist, is a criminal.11 
 
According to Kierkegaard, an enquiry into existence does not begin with the possibility 
of something’s existence, but starts from an actually existing thing. Translated into 
theological method, we might say that enquiry into God does not begin with the creation 
of a simulacra whose possible existence we proceed to discuss, but rather with the 
actuality of some kind of encounter, whatever form it might take. The latter method is 
most obviously, but not unproblematically, exemplified in twentieth century systematic 
theology by Karl Barth for whom theology begins not with the possibility of knowledge 
of God, but with the actuality of God’s self-disclosure in revelation. 
 
In this essay, I will focus particularly on the apparent prioritisation of the potential (the 
possibility of God, or the possibility of knowledge of God) in aspects of the philosophical 
tradition. From where did philosophy’s emphasis on ‘possibility’ emerge? One might 
think that the stress on possibility is part of a tradition of general incredulity and doubt 
which focuses not on what we know, but ‘whether’ or ‘how’ we know what we know, 
and under what conditions knowledge is possible. In other words, it could be associated 
with modern philosophy’s very particular concern with epistemology. Yet the doubting 
and incredulous stance which is characteristic of the priority of the possible over the 
actual might be reflected in a tradition which has influenced, and indeed characterised, so 
much Christian theology, namely the apophatic. Does apophaticism, whether in theology 
                                                 
11 Søren Kierkegaard (Johannes Climacus), ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 
Philosophical Fragments, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985, p.40. 
or philosophy, begin in reticent and sceptical fashion by probing the possibility of 
knowledge? If not, in what sense is there a priority of the actual in such theology and 
philosophy? My discussion will begin with Nicholas of Cusa who, while being perhaps 
the final representative of Neoplatonic apophaticism in theological and philosophical 
enquiry, is nevertheless often interpreted as a proto-modern sceptic who is concerned first 
with the possibility of knowledge.12 I will argue that in Cusa’s discussion of wisdom he 
begins with the actuality of encounter, but does not offer any kind of positivistic 
theological knowledge which is characteristic of modern notions of God’s self-
revelation.13 Rather, the possibility of creation – including human knowing – is an ‘actual 
possibility’ in God’s eternal nature. Moreover, the measure of our knowledge is not any 
series of concepts which we devise; it is the simplicity of God’s knowledge. 
 
Cusa is no sceptic concerned with the mere possibility of cognition, for he understands 
that knowledge, while beginning in ‘learned ignorance’, is always partial but never ‘off-
the-mark’. The notion that knowledge is merely ‘representation’ (rather than 
participation) introduces the sense of doubt and a concern with the possibility of 
knowledge. I will further locate the priority of the possible over the actual in the rise of 
theological nominalism characteristic of the work of, amongst others, William of 
Ockham. Here, in the focus on the possibility of divine deception alongside the notion of 
possible worlds which are mere reconfigurations of the individuals which compose the 
                                                 
12 See Jasper Hopkins, ‘Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464): First Modern Philosopher’ in Peter A. 
French and Howard K. Wettstein, Renaissance and Early Modern Philosophy (Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, vol. XXVI), (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp.13-29. 
13 On the Hegelian background to the notion of ‘self-revelation’, so Johannes Hoff’s very important essay 
‘The Rise and Fall of the Kantian Paradigm of Modern Theology’ in Conor Cunningham and Peter Candler 
(eds), The Gradeur of Reason (London: SCM, 2010). 
world we inhabit, we will see a characteristically modern variant of scepticism which is 
always concerned with what might be rather than with what is.14 More particularly, I will 
suggest that Ockham’s nominalism leads to the view that phenomena can be analysed as 
abstracted from their created context in such a way that ‘idealised’ phenomena or 
‘simulacra’ – which remain mere possibilities, not actualities as encountered in the world 
– become the subject matter of philosophy. 
 
What of theology which apparently begins not with possibilities or simulacra, but rather 
with the actuality of God’s self-donation? This aspect of the theological is the focus of an 
important analysis by Jean-Luc Marion who describes clearly the way in which 
philosophy, in its phenomenological guise, struggles to think of revelation even as a 
possibility.15 Moving to this more recent analysis of possibility and actuality in theology 
and philosophy, I will suggest that theology reasserts the priority of the actual in all 
enquiry. Why? Because theology avoids the subject-object dualism by which conditions 
for possible knowledge are established in relation to knowing subjects. Instead, theology 
begins with creatures and the actuality of creation as it gives itself to be known in relation 
to an eternally actual creator. 
 
Actuality and the Apophatic 
The history of scepticism, extending from Pyrrho, Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes 
Laertius in antiquity to Descartes in early modernity, is thought to have undergone a 
                                                 
14 The term ‘scepticism’ has a technical and restricted definition in philosophy. For now, I use it in the 
broadest sense to refer to a radical incredulity which is concerned with the possibility of knowledge. Later 
in this essay, the distinction between scepticism and incredulity will become clearer. 
15 For example, see Martin Heidegger (trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson), Being and Time 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), Introduction.II, para 7, p.63. 
revival in the Renaissance as the influence of Aristotle diminished.16 Such scepticism, 
broadly conceived, is concerned with the very possibility of knowledge. Is Nicholas of 
Cusa, writing in the first half of the fifteenth century, an early representative of modern 
philosophy, or does he preserve a more traditional view which is consonant with the 
theology and philosophy of the high Middle Ages? For Cusa, as with Plato, philosophy 
understood as the love of wisdom begins in the realisation of what we do not know. 
However, this is not pure and unadulterated negativity which simply rests in our 
ignorance. Why? Because the realisation of what we do not know is – paradoxically – 
itself knowledge. But where can this knowledge of our ignorance come from? It emerges 
from the priority of the actual disclosure of being over the pure possibility of our 
knowledge which in turn provokes desire for wisdom.17 Cusa writes of this intense desire 
for wisdom in the form of a dialogue between someone with no formal education – the 
Idiota – and the apparently wise and learned Orator.18 The Idiota points out that the 
Orator claims to be wise, but is in fact ignorant of his own ignorance. The two retire to a 
                                                 
16 See Richard Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). For a revised view of scepticism in the Middle Ages, see Henrik Lagerlund (ed.), Rethinking 
the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medieval Background (Leiden: Brill, 2010). 
17 Much of what I have to say depends on an important distinction to which Sarah Coakley and Bernard 
McGinn have recently pointed, namely that between apophaticism on the one hand, and the tradition of 
negative theology, the via negativa, on the other. The Latin via negativa refers, of course, to the negation of 
our concept of God, and occasionally even to the negation of our negations in the Greek Dionysian 
tradition. As Coakley points out, the Greek apophasis means ‘saying no’, this being mirrored in the Latin 
tradition of the negative way. However, apophasis might also convey a sense of ‘revelation’, from the verb 
apophaino, ‘to show forth’ or ‘to display’. So rather than resting in a mere negation of whatever we 
encounter, the apophatic tradition, beginning with apophaino, begins first with the actuality of a positive 
disclosure of being. So when I talk of the apophatic, I wish to emphasise not the unmitigated negativity in 
some strands of the via negativa, but the priority of revelation and disclosure in the apophatic. See Sarah 
Coakley, ‘Introduction – Re-thinking Dionysius the Areopogite’, Modern Theology 24(4), 2008, p.539, 
n.30 citing Bernard McGinn, ‘Three Forms of Negativity in Christian Mysticism’ in John W. Bowker (ed.), 
Knowing the Unknowable: Science and the Religions on God and the Universe (London: I. B. Taurus, 
2008). 
18 Nicholas of Cusa, De Sapientia in Jasper Hopkins (trans.), Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge 
(Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1996). 
barber’s shop to discuss the matter, whereupon the Idiota uses a number of 
characteristically Cusan examples to explain his position. 
 
Wisdom, says the Idiota, proclaims itself in the streets and declares that it dwells in the 
highest places. So the Idiota looks to the streets, to the market place, and points out that 
one can see money being counted, goods being weighed and oil being measured out. By 
the reasoning of counting, weighing and measuring, human beings discriminate by means 
of a single unit. One is the beginning of number (all subsequent numbers are multiples of 
one), the smallest weight is the beginning of weighing, and the smallest measure the 
beginning of measuring. For the sake of argument, the Idiota takes the smallest weight to 
be the ounce, the smallest measure to be the inch. Every number is constructed by means 
of the one, every weight by means of the ounce, and every measure by means of the inch. 
But by what, asks the Idiota, do we attain to the one, to the ounce or the inch? Oness is 
not attained to by number, because number is subsequent to the one. Likewise, the ounce 
is not attained to by means of weight, nor the inch by means of measurement. 
 
What is Cusa’s point here? It is that the composite cannot be the measure of the simple, 
or that what is subsequent to an origin cannot be the measure of its origin. Take the 
example of creation in Christian theology: the creative act cannot itself be a natural 
process, for natural processes are subsequent to creation and cannot ‘measure’ creation. 
This is the basis for the Judaic, Christian and Islamic conviction that God creates ex 
nihilo. As Cusa writes, 
 
…the Beginning of all things is that by means of which, in which and from which 
whatever can be originated is originated; and, nevertheless, [that Beginning] 
cannot be attained unto by any originated thing. It is that by means of which, in 
which and from which everything that can be understood is understood; and 
nevertheless, it cannot be attained unto by the intellect.19 
 
To put this in the parlance of Platonic metaphysics, Cusa is expressing the conviction 
that, for example, the Form of horse is not itself a horse.20 Moreoever, particular horses 
do not ‘measure’ the Form ‘horse’, but rather the reverse. Thus that which is the origin of 
measure is not itself a measure, that which is the origin of weight is not itself a weight, 
and that which is the origin of being is not itself a being. 
 
Continuing his discussion of the wisdom which philosophy seeks, Cusa defines ‘supreme 
wisdom’ in the following perplexing way: ‘that you know…how it is that the 
Unattainable is attained to unattainably.’21 This is a characteristically Cusan paradox. 
What does this mean? Cusa is pointing out that the means by which we attain knowledge, 
namely by comparison and measuring one thing in terms of another through a proportion, 
cannot be the means by which we attain that which is simple and the measure of all 
things. In other words, whatever means we use to attain knowledge of creation or the 
natural world, we cannot use those same means to attain knowledge of the origin of 
creation or the natural world. Why not? Because this would be to treat that origin as part 
                                                 
19 Nicholas of Cusa, De Sapientia I.8. 
20 This interpretation of Plato’s metaphysics of the Forms refers particularly to its later expression in the 
Theaetetus. 
21 Nicholas of Cusa, De Sapientia, I.7. 
of the order it is supposed to measure – in other words, as an object amongst other 
objects. In fact, in De Docta Ignorantia (‘On Learned Ignorance’), Cusa goes further and 
states that wisdom is the realisation that God is beyond all distinction – potency and act, 
motion and rest, lesser or greater, light and dark, maximum and minimum – and in God 
all opposites coincide.22 Why? Because the absolute simplicity of God measures these 
spectra. It is not that God lies at the extreme end of, say, the act-potency or rest-motion 
spectrum. This would be to conceive God through a kind of proportionality, and such 
speech about God would in fact be speech about a creature. The crucial point for Cusa is 
that there cannot be a proportion between finite and infinite. The finite world is not 
simply a smaller version of the infinite. Rather, the infinite comprehends within itself all 
finitude because it is not itself just a very big finite thing. 
 
The notion that opposites coincide in the simplicity of God is most clearly expounded in  
Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia, God is the ‘absolute maximum’, exceeding all opposition, 
even the law of non-contradiction.23 More particularly, God is beyond the Aristotelian 
distinction of act and potency, for God is what Cusa calls the possest, the coincidence of 
posse and est, of possibility and actuality, although he is deploying these terms in a quite 
unAristotelian way.24 God is all that it is possible for God to be, and God contains within 
himself all real possibilities. No creature has realised all that it is possible for it to be, yet 
somewhat paradoxically that possibility is actual; that actual possibility – the possest – is 
God. 
                                                 
22 See Nicholas of Cusa, trans. H. Lawrence Bond, Selected Spiritual Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 
1997). All translations from De Docta Ignorantia are from this summary edition of Cusa’s works. 
23 Nicholas of Cusa, De Docta Ignorantia, I.4. 
24 Nicholas of Cusa, De Possest available in Jasper Hopkins, A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Nicholas of Cusa (3rd ed.) (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1986),  
 At first glance, it appears that Cusa is proposing something rather different to the 
Aristotelian notion of God as actus purus. However, it would be better to understand 
Cusa as refining in a very subtle way the Thomist priority of actuality over potentiality. 
For Cusa, one cannot, strictly speaking, speak of ‘priority’ in God because this implies 
composition. He states, 
 
Therefore, absolute possibility, about which we are speaking and through which 
those things that actually exist are able actually to exist, does not precede 
actuality. Nor does it succeed actuality; for how would actuality be able to exist if 
possibility did not exist? Therefore, absolute possibility, actuality, and the union 
of the two are co-eternal.25 
 
He goes on to explain that in creation, the actual and possible become distinct. This 
means that creatures feature potentiality, but that potentiality is defined with reference to 
a prior actuality that lies elsewhere, in another. In the end, all potentiality in creation is 
only real – that is, an ‘actual potential’ – in relation to God himself. By contrast, Cusa 
maintains this division does not pertain to God. Within God’s eternity is contained all 
that it is possible for God to be, yet that possibility is at once actual. God eternally 
actualises himself. 
 
I am speaking in absolute and very general terms -  as if I were saying: “Since 
possibility and actuality are identical in God, God is – actually – everything of 
                                                 
25 Nicholas of Cusa, De Possest, 6. 
which ‘is able to be’ can be predicated truly.” For there can be nothing that God 
[can be but] is not actually. However, the case of the sun is different. For although 
the sun is actually what it is, it not what it is able to be. For [the sun] is able to 
exist otherwise than it actually is.26 
 
Once again, Cusa is claiming that God does not simply lie at the far end of a series of 
metaphysical spectra such as those between potency and act or motion and rest. This 
would be to conceive of God in terms which are too univocal with creatures. God is the 
‘coincidence’ of these opposites, for he comprehends or ‘enfolds’ the very spectra 
themselves.27 God is the trinity of absolute possibility, absolute actuality and the union of 
the two. 
 
This has implications not only for our knowledge of God, but for the nature of our 
knowledge in general. For Cusa, we attain knowledge by the comparison of one thing 
with another. Moreover, human perception is always from a certain perspective, and only 
God views each object from an infinite number of perspectives at once and therefore 
knows each thing as it is in itself. In De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa puts it this way: 
 
A finite intellect…cannot precisely attain the truth of things by means of a 
likeness. For truth is neither more nor less but indivisible. Nothing not 
                                                 
26 Nicholas of Cusa, De Possest, 8. 
27 Nicholas of Cusa, De Possest, 8: ‘Therefore, since the facts of the matter are such that God is Absolute 
Possibility, is Actuality, and is the Union of the two (and so, He is actually every possible being): clearly, 
He is all things, in the sense of enfolding all things. For everything that in any way either exists or can exist 
in enfolded in this Beginning. And whatever either has been created or will be created in unfolded from 
Him, in whom it is enfolded.’ Cusa’s position is on the same trajectory as Aquinas. See Summa 
Theologiae, 1a.14.a9. 
itself true is capable of precisely measuring what is true…So the intellect, 
which is not truth, never comprehends truth so precisely but that it could 
always be comprehended with infinitely more precision…Therefore, the 
quiddity of things, which is the truth of beings, is unattainable in its purity, 
and although it is pursued by all philosophers, none has found it as it is. 
The more profoundly learned we are in this ignorance, the more closely 
we draw near to truth itself.28 
 
This has led some commentators to see in Cusa a proto-modern scepticism, particularly 
concerning empirical knowledge. Is this the case? What we certainly do not find in Cusa 
is anything like the division between the phenomenal and the noumenal, or Locke’s 
primary and secondary qualities. Our knowledge or perception of things is merely a 
partial knowledge which can be infinitely perfected. Most importantly, however, is 
Cusa’s claim that our knowledge is not the measure of things, but is rather itself 
measured. First, the intellect is measured by what it knows, but ultimately it is measured 
by God’s simple and eternal knowledge. This means that potential human knowledge is 
measured by a prior actuality: the actuality of that which is known, whose potential is, in 
turn, a sharing in the actuality of God’s knowledge, which is God’s eternal self. This is in 
contrast to much modern philosophy which begins, as in Kant, with the a priori 
‘conditions for the possibility of knowledge’. So under this modern philosophical scheme 
what measures human knowledge is not some prior actuality which gives itself to be 
known and which has its ultimate origin in the eternally simple source of being, but rather 
the pre-established conditions under which knowledge is deemed possible. In short, 
                                                 
28 Nicholas of Cusa, De Docta Ignorantia, I.3; See also De Sapientia II.38. 
human knowledge becomes its own measure, whereupon it becomes idolatrous; what we 
see in our knowledge is merely ourselves. 
 
Cusa’s notion that our knowledge is partial and, while not ‘off the mark’, always subject 
to ever-greater perfecting, is indicative of a more general Neoplatonic tradition of which 
he is one of the last representatives. That tradition used the metaphor of illumination in 
speaking of human knowledge. In Plato’s dialogue The Republic, Socrates famously 
describes knowledge and the nature of the Good metaphorically with reference to the 
illumination provided by the sun.29 He points out that the sun provides light, warmth and 
therefore sustenance to the creatures and objects around us, and also illuminates the 
world to make things visible and therefore knowable. This becomes a metaphor for the 
illumination provided by the Good within the visible realm which we inhabit. For Plato, 
the Good makes things knowable, and it is by participation in the Good that things come 
to be and are sustained.  Crucially, we can participate in the Good with more or less 
intensity. Moreover, fact and value are not in any way dissociated: something is 
knowable – and something is – to the extent that it is good. My intellect can be more or 
less intensely illuminated by the Good, and the visible realm which I attempt to know 
will be more or less knowable according to the intensity of its share in the Good. So 
knowledge can be more or less bright. 
 
This tradition had a broad influence on Christian belief and practice leading up to the 
high Middle Ages. To believe in God was not to believe in just another object within our 
metaphorical visual field, but to believe that our knowledge is made possible by 
                                                 
29 Plato, Republic VI.508a ff. 
something wholly other to which creation points – that there is something actual which 
precedes our knowledge’s possibility. Yet this belief and knowledge is not thought to be 
untrustworthy and therefore a source of scepticism, bur rather partial and susceptible to 
ever greater illumination and clarity of vision. As Cusa put it, our knowledge is capable 
of ever greater precision. Most importantly, true wisdom is thought to begin in realising 
the dimness of one’s own perceptions of that which gives itself to be known. 
 
Representation, Deceit and Ideal Knowledge 
How is this tradition of knowledge as illumination superseded in modernity in such a way 
that potentiality comes to have priority over actuality? I will consider two important 
shifts in late mediaeval thought: the understanding of knowledge as representation, and 
theological nominalism. 
 
The debate about the nature of the univocity of being in the thought of John Duns Scotus 
has been particularly contentious of late. What is less contentious is the claim that Scotus 
anticipates a particularly modern form of epistemology when he teaches that knowledge 
is a form of representation rather than illumination.30 What does this mean? Imagine I am 
gazing at a tree. According to view that knowledge is merely representation, my 
knowledge of a tree is rather akin to my mind taking a snapshot of the tree as if my mind 
                                                 
30 The most scholarly treatment to date of this aspect of Scotus’s thought is Olivier Boulnois, Être et 
Représentation: Une genealogie de la métaphysique moderne à l’époque de Duns Scot (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1999). Of course, the best known recent critique of the representational theory of 
knowledge is Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979). 
were a camera.31 Whereas for an earlier tradition the form of the tree would come to 
reside in the intellect in such a way that there is an intimate connection between knower 
and known, for this later tradition what I know is not the tree itself, but only a 
representation of the tree. This is significant for two reasons. First, representations can be 
the cause of mistrust. In other words, my representational knowledge of the tree can be 
called into doubt because it is only a representation – a picture or snapshot, if you like. 
Understood in this way, the knowledge which comes from our senses can be the object of 
suspicion and doubt, and hence knowledge as representation is often regarded as the 
beginnings of a peculiarly modern form of scepticism. A corollary of this provides the 
second reason why knowledge as representation in Scotus is important. Because 
knowledge is now somewhat problematic, the focus for philosophy shifts from what we 
know (in which ontology (the what) and epistemology (the knowledge) are intertwined) 
to how we know what we know. This therefore marks the invention of an autonomous 
and particular variant of philosophy which has become of almost exclusive concern in the 
modern period, namely epistemology – the study of ‘how’ or ‘whether’ we know what 
we know. With knowledge understood as representation, created beings are known 
without reference to a transcendent and simply are as they appear to be to us in our 
representation of them. We do not know things in themselves (however falteringly or 
partially), but only representations of those things. In some forms of modern philosophy, 
the central project therefore becomes exclusively epistemological: the assuaging of 
scepticism and radical doubt by the attainment of certain or foundational knowledge. 
 
                                                 
31 In his discussion of representational knowledge, Rorty uses a different metaphor: human knowledge is 
akin to the reflection of images in a mirror. Philosophy’s task is the polishing of the mirror in the hope that 
representations become clearer with respect to their objects. 
Further developments in theology and philosophy contribute to the history of sceptical 
enquiry and the concomitant prioritisation of the possible over the actual. The first 
concerns the possibility of divine deception which leads beyond mere incredulity. This is 
occasioned in part by William of Ockham’s much-debated view of intuitive and 
abstractive cognition.32 By ‘intuitive cognition’, Ockham means the immediate 
perception of an individual to which we are present by means of one or more of our 
senses. Importantly, this includes a judgement concerning whether or not the thing exists. 
Unlike earlier theories, an act of ‘abstractive cognition’ (which, broadly speaking at the 
risk of over-simplification, concerns imagination or recollection) does not necessarily 
concern the formulation of universal concepts from particulars. Instead, such cognition 
refers to abstraction from existence and non-existence. An act of abstractive cognition 
(such as a memory) does not contain within itself anything sufficient to cause me to 
assent to a proposition (for example that my memory of my friend wearing a black coat 
last night is true).33 For the moment, we are particularly concerned with Ockham’s view 
that we can have intuitive cognition of non-existent individuals. This is not to say that we 
have an intuitive cognition that something exists when in fact it does not exist. Rather, 
Ockham allows the possibility that one can have an intuitive cognition of something that 
does not exist, and part of that cognition is the (correct) understanding that what one 
                                                 
32 See, for example, William of Ockham (trans. Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E. Kelley), Quodlibetal 
Questions (Quodlibeta Septem) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), V.5. This aspect of Ockham’s 
epistemology is discussed in Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1999), ch.3 and Claude Panaccio and David Piché, ‘Ockham’s Reliabilism and the Intuition 
of Non-Existents’ in Henrik Lagerlund (ed.), Rethinking the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medieval 
Background (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 97-118. 
33 A more detailed and nuanced description of Ockham’s distinction between intuitive and abstractive 
cognition can be found in Elizabeth Karger, ‘Ockham’s Misunderstood Theory of Intuitive and Abstractive 
Cognition’ in Paul Vincent Spade (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (Cambridge University 
Press,  2000), 204-226. On the debate concerning the interpretation of Ockham on these issues, see also 
Elizabeth Karger, ‘Ockham and Wodeham on divine deception as a skeptical hypothesis’, Vivarium 42, 
2004, 225-236 and Eleonore Stump, ‘The Mechanisms of Cognition’ in Spade, op.cit., 168-203. 
intuits does not exist. This is not brought about naturally, as in the case of an intuitive 
cognition that something does exist (for example, the desk at which I am working), but 
rather by divine intervention. 
 
In this question I propose two theses. The first is that by God’s power 
there can be an intuitive cognition of an object that does not exist. I prove 
this, first, through the article of faith, ‘I believe in God the Father 
Almighty.’34 
 
As Panaccio and Piché suggest, the reasons why Ockham held this very unusual thesis 
are complex, but particularly concerned with the possibility of intuitive cognition of non-
existents suggested because of an emphasis on divine omnipotence and focus on the 
sovereign freedom of the divine will as distinct from the divine nature.35 However, one 
important consequence of Ockham’s thesis concerning the intuition of non-existents is 
that it affords a particular epistemological status to possibilities. In other words, I know 
non-existing things – which must nevertheless be potential – in the same way as I know 
existing things: by the certitude of intuitive cognition. 
 
The notion that we can have intuitive cognition of non-existents is, of course, not 
indicative of scepticism. However, when the possibility of divine ‘intervention’ in human 
cognition is entertained in this way, it does raises a possibility which was to appear with 
particular force in scepticism, particularly leading to the philosophy of Descartes: the 
                                                 
34 Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, VI.6. See also Ordinatio I.prologue. 
35 Panaccio and Piché, op.cit. (n.31)/ 
view that God could deceive us.36 To understand why this is particularly important in the 
history of scepticism, it is necessary to distinguish scepticism from mere questioning or 
incredulity. Take the case of a stick which is dipped into a bucket of water. It appears as 
if the stick bends or becomes crooked. Referring only to my sight, this is what I would 
believe is the case, although I can doubt very much that this is the case, partly because I 
can put my hand in the water and feel that the stick is still straight. However, with 
reference to something else in my ‘cognitive world’, namely an accumulated knowledge 
of optics and the effect of water on perception, I can prove that my initial perception that 
the stick is crooked requires amendment or nuance. The point about this process of 
reason is that I can use one aspect of my perception and understanding (optics and water) 
to correct another aspect of my perception and understanding (the crooked appearance of 
the stick). This is how the usual process of inquiry and general incredulity operates in any 
intellectual enterprise. What makes divine deception different is that it calls into question 
every aspect of my perception and understanding in such a way that I cannot use one part 
to correct or amend another. The result of this emphasis on divine deception – the idea 
that God could annihilate the world while preserving my perception of that world – is that 
the reality of the world is indistinguishable from the possibility that it has been 
annihilated while my perception of that world is preserved. In principle, therefore, there 
is no way to end one’s incredulity in the case of such scepticism; possibility reigns. 
 
                                                 
36 Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, V.5: ‘Nonetheless, God can cause an act of believing through which I 
believe a thing to be present that is [in fact] absent. And I claim that this belief-cognition will be 
abstractive, not intuitive. And through such an act of faith a thing can appear to be present when it is 
absent.’ 
However, Ockham’s nominalism and his so-called ‘principle of annihilation’, articulated 
in the context of the discussion of the intuition of non-existents, marks, as Amos 
Funkenstein has shown, the radical shift from the theological cosmology of Aquinas and 
that which will be articulated by Cusa a century or so after Ockham.37 
 
Further, every absolute thing that is distinct in place and subject from every other 
absolute thing can by God’s power exist when that other absolute thing is 
destroyed.38 
 
For Aquinas and Cusa, any existing singular is part of an intricate and delicate system of 
reference which, crucially, forms a whole. This had been the conviction expressed in 
Platonic and Neoplatonic cosmologies extending back to the Timaeus: the cosmos forms 
a universe. One could only understand a part with reference to the other parts and, 
ultimately, the whole. For Ockham, by contrast, the parts of the universe were ‘self-
standing’ and comprehensible in their singularity. One part could be annihilated without 
consequence for the remainder. As Funkenstein remarks, while, for Aquinas, God could 
create other worlds (and thus they are ‘possible’), each of those worlds forms a coherent 
whole such that one part belongs intrinsically within that whole. For Ockham, every 
individual thing is ‘immediate to God’ in such a way that the individuals composing the 
world we inhabit could be reconfigured in an infinity of possible ways to form possible 
worlds. Unlike earlier thinkers, Ockham could therefore conceive of possible worlds 
                                                 
37 Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), especially p.135. 
38 Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, VI.6; William of Ockham (ed. P. Boehner), Philosophical Writings 
(Edinburgh: Hacket Publishing, 1957), p.26. 
which are mere re-configurations of the world we inhabit. For Aquinas, this makes little 
sense. The individuals of this world are constituted in their identity by their very place in 
the whole. Take them out of that context and they are no longer what they were. 
 
The consequence of Ockham’s nominalism and principle of annihilation which concerns 
us more immediately is the notion of ‘idealised experiments’. If individuals are 
immediate to God and therefore intelligible in their individuality divorced from any wider 
context within creation, this makes it thinkable to ‘annihilate’ all but those phenomena 
one wishes to consider. One could therefore conceive of a particular phenomena in nature 
say the motion of a body removed from any particular context and consider only that 
motion. Thus one can imagine an ‘idealised’ or ‘pristine’ motion which is stripped of any 
complexity or context. A clear example of such an ‘ideal’ is Isaac Newton’s reference to 
a single body in motion through a vacuum.39 All other aspects of creation – the context, 
for example, of motion – have been removed or ‘annihilated’. Newton uses such an 
‘idealised moving body’ to formulate his three laws of motion. No such motion has ever 
pertained for all ‘actual’ motion that we observe occurs within an intricate context which 
furnishes it with meaning. For Newton, natural philosophy as represented in the idealised 
thought experiments of the Principia Mathematica is not concerned with the world as it is 
actually received, but an idealised ‘possible world’ represented by phenomena divorced 
from their context. In such circumstances, natural philosophy’s starting point is not the 
world as it is encountered, in all its complexity, but an approximation which is but a 
                                                 
39 For a more detailed discussion of Newton’s understanding of motion in relation to idealised experiment, 
see Simon Oliver, Philosophy, God and Motion (London: Routledge, 2005), ch.6. 
possibility or ‘simulacrum’. It is a ‘possibility’, a construct arrived at through 
annihilation. 
 
In returning to Cusa, it is possible to see the further importance of this development in 
relation to the priority of the possible over the actual. For Cusa, it is the eternal simplicity 
of divine self-knowledge which ‘measures’ our knowledge and ensures its veracity. This 
is to say that it is the actual which measures the possible. In a natural philosophy which is 
concerned with idealisations, it is the reverse: the possible measures the actual. For 
Newton, for example, it was the possible (idealised) motion of a single body in a vacuum 
which is used as the measure of all actual motions. This in turn can be translated into the 
method of philosophy of religion which begins with simulacra. An ‘idealised’ possible 
being, which we name ‘God’, is used to measure and interpret the actual world. Either the 
simulacrum we call ‘God’ is shown to be a bad measure, in which case it is disposed of in 
favour of another possibility (certain forms of atheism or scientism), or we alter and 
nuance the simulacrum so that the world becomes measurable by its standards 
(fundamentalism). Either way, the possible measures the actual. 
 
Phenomenology and the Possibility of Revelation 
Has philosophy attempted to progress from its confinement within ideal possibilities 
which form approximations to the actuality of the world? Twentieth century philosophy 
in the form of phenomenology represents, in part, a wholesale rejection of 
representational knowledge and an attempt to return to ‘the things themselves’. There is a 
sense in which this form of philosophy strives to begin with the actuality of the givenness 
of the world to human consciousness. In a recent essay, Jean-Luc Marion asks whether 
such an approach to philosophy can offer more to theology, given that the former tends to 
prioritise conjecture and possibility while the latter concerns actuality.40 He discusses 
what he takes to be a core aspect of religion and theology, namely revelation, and asks 
whether philosophy can at least admit the possibility of revelation. On the face of it, there 
is a clear difficulty: revelation entails an authority transcending experience manifesting 
itself experientially. Under the principle of sufficient reason (Kant’s ‘religion within the 
limits of mere reason’), Marion concludes that revelation is rendered impossible. 
 
The emergence of the principle of reason forces metaphysics to assign each being 
its concept and its cause, to the point of dismissing any beings irreducible to a 
conceptualizable cause as illegitimate and hence impossible. It is therefore no 
fortuitous coincidence that the thinkers of the causa sive ratio also disqualified the 
possibility of miracles and revelation in general. In this sense, religion remains 
admissible only by renouncing revelation in the full sense.41 
 
This suggests that philosophy of religion will establish the conditions for the possibility 
of revelation a priori, in advance of revelation’s actuality. This neutralises revelation, for 
it will subject revelation to established conditions of reason in such a way that it becomes 
no revelation at all. Once again, we are left discussing chimera or idols. If revelation 
remains, it does so as moral law or as irrational and fanatical, breaking the conditions of 
its own possibility. 
                                                 
40 See Jean-Luc Marion, ‘The Possible and Revelation’ in idem. (trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner et al), 
The Visible and the Revealed (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 1-17. 
41 Ibid., p.2. 
 Marion asks whether the phenomenological method can open the possibility of revelation 
and thus provide some relationship with theology. However, the Kantian transcendental 
method which attempts to delineate ‘the conditions for the possibility of knowledge’ still, 
for Marion, haunts phenomenology as conceived by Husserl.42 For Kant, the possibility 
of knowledge is conditioned by the formal condition of intuition and concepts. This is the 
lens through which phenomena are received. The world is never received as it actually is, 
but under the conditions for the possibility of knowledge.43 Nevertheless, by referring to 
the sheer ‘givenness’ of phenomena, the Kantian limits of the possible are extended. 
Genuinely to return to the things themselves means that our intention (that is, what we 
intend or surmise in the face of a particular experience which marks the limits of the 
possible) is subsequent to the fact of being given to consciousness which testifies to the 
necessity of receiving phenomena as they give themselves, not according to conditions of 
possibility. So Marion writes, 
 
By thus lifting the prohibition of sufficient reason, phenomenology liberates 
possibility and hence open the field possibly even to phenomena marks by 
impossibility.44 
What philosophy of religion tends to close, phenomenology of religion could 
open.45 
                                                 
42 See Jean-Luc Marion, ‘The Saturated Phenomenon’ in idem. (trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner et al), 
The Visible and the Revealed (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 18-65. 
43 See Immanuel Kant (trans. Norman Kemp Smith), Critique of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan, 1993), 
p.238 (A218/ B265). 
44 Ibid., p.5. 
45 Ibid., p.7. 
 However, Marion suggests that there are still problems with the phenomenological 
method. Put very briefly, he is concerned that this approach to philosophy continues to 
establish an horizon which, while not rendering revelation impossible, will nevertheless 
subject revelation to ‘conditions of possibility.’ He cites two in particular: the I and the 
horizon. The first, the I, concerns the method of reduction. Phenomenology involves a 
reduction of the every-day lived experience of the world towards the intention of a 
conscious subject – a transcendental subjectivity. Marion’s concern is that whatever is 
received in revelation remains constituted by this ‘I’. In other words, there remains a 
subject-object relation: the subject constitutes the phenomenological object in such a way 
that the I forms another condition of possibility for revelation. Yet ‘The I has not the 
slightest idea, notion, or expectation regarding who or what is revealed.’46 The notion of 
‘reduction’ seems to preclude, or at least radically limit, revelation. Similarly, 
phenomenology, according to Marion, ‘presupposes a horizon for presenting the 
phenomena it reduces and constructs.’47 In the case of Heidegger, this horizon is Being 
under which ‘God’ is thought. 
 
But the holy, which alone is the essential sphere of divinity, which in turn alone 
affords a dimension for the gods and for God, [the sacred] comes to radiate only 
when being itself beforehand and after extensive preparation has been cleared and 
is experienced in its truth.48 
                                                 
46 Ibid., p.9. 
47 Ibid., p.10. 
48 Martin Heidegger (ed. William McNeil, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi), ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Pathmarks 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.258, cited and quoted in Marion, op.cit., p,11. Marion 
 In other words, God can only be made manifest within a particular space which is 
measured by Being rather than by God himself. 
 
We are left, therefore, with phenomenology delineating the possibility of revelation in 
advance of its actuality which, according to Marion, in effect neutralises the possibility of 
revelation. It renders revelation ‘impossible’  in such a way that revelation takes on an 
‘extrinsicist’ character: it arrives ‘outside’ the established conditions of possibility for 
experience. Under such circumstances, revelation is simply reduced to the bizarre, the 
weird or the unintelligible. 
 
Marion’s answer to this aporia of revelation comes in the form of his concept of the 
‘saturated phenomenon’, of which revelation is the most acute kind.49 Put briefly, a 
saturated phenomenon can be distinguished from the everyday experience of an ordinary 
object in the following way. According to Husserl, intention is always in excess of 
intuition. In other words, I see the mug on my desk from just one of an infinite number of 
perspectives as the mug gives itself to be known. My intuition is limited by a single 
perspective. But what I ‘intend’ is the mug in its entirety: its countless uses, the infinite 
circumstances in which it might be viewed, and so on. This is to say that the object is 
constituted by the transcendental subject, namely by the intention. By contrast, the 
saturated phenomenon is the reverse; what is given in intuition exceeds intentionality. 
                                                                                                                                                 
remarks that the transcendental method of Rahner is subject to precisely this horizon of Being with respect 
to revelation. 
49 See Jean-Luc Marion (trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky), Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002), 199-247. 
The intention which is contributed by the I is overwhelmed by what is given by the 
phenomenon concerned. For example, in viewing Christ dying on the cross what I intend 
is the execution of a first century Jewish man; what is given in intuition is the incarnate 
Son of God dying for the sins of the world. For Marion, the I is constituted by the 
saturated phenomenon, whereas in ordinary experience the I constitutes the intuited 
object. To put this is Cusa’s terms as discussed above, human knowledge becomes 
measured by the actuality of God’s givenness, rather than being the measure that 
constitutes possibility. 
 
This very brief discussion of Marion’s position suggests the way in which 
phenomenology’s continued prioritisation of the possible and its concomitant inability to 
think revelation outside of its own conditions of possibility is overcome: philosophy 
becomes subject to the prior actuality of God’s givenness in revelation because, through 
the saturated phenomenon, revelation establishes its own horizon in constituting the I 
who receives that revelation. In essence, Marion is talking the language of grace with 
respect to theology and philosophy. However, there remain two concerns. First, 
revelation has been defined with reference to a particular kind of phenomena, the 
saturated, and then again a particular kind of saturated phenomena. This leaves behind a 
residue of so-called ‘ordinary phenomena’ which we might think belong to the 
philosophical enterprise. Meanwhile, theology deals with a delineated subject matter in 
the form revelation understood as a variety of saturated phenomena. Secondly, and 
related to this first concern, philosophy in the guise of phenomenology remains within the 
dualism of subject and object; there is always a suspicion that the I will in some way 
continue to mark the horizon of possibility unless the whole of human consciousness, 
including the reception of ordinary phenomena, is rendered subject to a prior actuality. 
Can these concerns be assuaged? The division between subject and object is peculiar to 
modernity and is alien to pre-modern theology. Instead of this dualism, theologians such 
as Aquinas typically refer to ‘creatures’ and creation. Moreover, as we saw above with 
respect to idealised ‘possible’ phenomena, creation forms a unity in which each part is 
constituted by its relation to the whole. There is little sense in which an I, as an isolated 
individual consciousness, can constitute a condition of possibility for the experience of 
objects in the world. Rather, because the ‘I’ is more fundamentally a creature embedded 
by necessity in creation, it is constituted by the prior actuality of that creation. Moreover, 
the actuality of that creation is more than any person could imagine. On this view, there is 
a sense in which all pheneomena are, to some degree, saturated. Why? Because what we 
intuit in creatures, rather than objects, will always exceed our mere intention because the 
creature, precisely in being created, always already implies the radical otherness of the 
creator. 
 
Marion’s scheme of the saturated phenomenon distinct from ordinary phenomena leaves 
with it the sense of an ‘ordinary nature’ that is not graced. There also remains a parallel 
dualism in the form of subject and object. By reconfiguring this scheme in terms of 
creation, all phenomena can be described as ‘saturated’ in Marion’s sense in such way 
that the whole of creation becomes, to some degree, revelatory and in excess of our 
attempts to grasp it or subject it to a priori conditions of knowledge – to possibilities 
rather than actualities. This becomes more reminiscent of the Cusan scheme described 
above in which we begin with the actuality of creation as it gives itself to us, and as it 
constitutes us by that gift. That actuality remains in excess of our ability to grasp it, and 
yet our grasp is not ‘off the mark’ in a way that would suggest sceptical doubt. This 
entails, however, beginning the philosophical and theological task with docta ignorantia: 
learning that the actuality of creation exceeds us infinitely and yet, in its givenness from 
an eternally actual source, is the starting point of all our enquiry. 
 
 
 
 
